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INTRODUCTION
The major concern of the Zimbabwe government is the size of 
its budget deficit and all that come with it. In particular, 
the source of resources to finance the deficit, its impact on 
the productive sectors of the economy; money supply levels and 
the rate of inflation; the proportion of capital and recurrent 
expenditure etc. Reducing the size of the deficit becomes 
therefore one of the most important objectives of the Economic 
Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP) embraced by government 
in 1990. Critics have pre-emptied that the success of reforms 
being implemented in countries in the southern region 
(Zimbabwe included) is based on keeping budget deficits small, 
encouraging competition and higher productivity and abolishing 
marketing boards and privatising public enterprises (Poortman 
1994; Hawkins 1993; Ndiweni 1993).
To succeed in reducing the budget deficit which is currently 
pegged at 10% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP), public 
expenditure curtailment and co^t saving are the two avenues 
through which fiscal policy will be implemented (Rukobo 1991). 
Subsequent targets for redress are consequently the civil 
service and the Qublic sector Enterprises. In other words 
reducing the budget deficit and reforming the Public Sector 
are but two sides of the same coin. This article is not going 
to address both target areas. It will focus only on the Public 
Sector Enterprises (PSE).
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A Public Sector Enterprise (or Parastatal as they are 
popularly known in Zimbabwe) is a corporate body established7'^^ 
by an Act of Parliament to carry out specific functions 
specified in the Act, which is governed by a Board of which 
all, or the majority of the members are appointed by the 
President, a Minister or the Parastatals Commission (Smith 
1989). Both the successive colonial governments (before 1980) 
and the post independence nationalist government acknowledged 
the importance of PSE. Those established by the colonial 
governments.were inherited at independence and new ones were 
created. The sector consists of 44 state owned enterprises at 
last count (Smith 1989) and account for not less than 30% of 
all social and economic activities (Gvt 1991). With such a 
high level of activity being performed in the state sector, 
the performance of and change in the PSE operations affect as 
a rule the outcome of the whole economy.
The introduction of the Economic Structural Adjustment 
Programme (ESAP) in 1990, put privatisation of and/or 
reforming the Public Sector Enterprises which account for 3.7% 
of the budget deficit high on the agenda of both government 
and financial donor organisations. Government concern on the 
contribution of PSEs to the budget deficit nonetheless dates 
back to the second half of the 1980s when the Smith 
Commission of enquiry into the administration of Parastatals 
was established to focus on, among other issues, the 
structure, organisation and performance of PSE (for 
recommendation see Smith 1989).
The elimination of losses of and subsidies to PSE, the 
argument goes, will move government towards its two pronged 
objective of reducing budget deficit to 5% of GDP and 
balancing recurrent expenditure with total revenues collected. 
The pertinent question lingering in the minds of reformists is 
how best can this be achieved preferably with(out) minimum 
negative implications.
With the current waive of "market friendly development" 
privatisation has become a major component of economic policy 
packages in the 1990's (Adam 1992) and is likely to remain so 
through into the 21st century .^However the success of 
privatisation in transforming the loss making PSEs in 
developing countries is already being questioned (ibid; 
Klitgaard 1991; Grosh 1992; Cook 1988, 1993 ) on the basis of 
lack of institutional foundations of free markets; the 
necessary environment for efficient market competition ; sound 
regulatory structures and other non-economic factors 
characteristic of these economies. The purpose of this article 
therefore is to examine the case for commercialisation against 
the background that economic variables as well as non-economic 
factors are taking the steam out of privatisation's "total 
onslaught" in developing countries.
The article is divided into five sections beginning with the 
introduction. The second will look at the trend of the budget 
deficit over a period of ten years from 1983-84 financial year 
and illustrate the relationship between deficit and public
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investments and consequently with the PSE losses. A definition 
of the concept of privatisation and a review of the current 
debates on the same will be done in section three. An effort 
is made to demonstrate the causative relationship between 
privatisation on the one hand and profitability, growth and 
efficiency on the other hand. The role of ownership vis-a-vis 
the market environment, managerial culture etc provides the 
conclusion to the section. A case for commercialisation is 
discussed in the fourth section, followed in the fifth and 
last section by the conclusion.
BUDGET DEFICIT AMD PUBLIC ENTERPRISES' SUBSIDIES
This section seeks to briefly analyse the relationship between 
the expenditure and revenue sides of the budget since the 
1983-84 financial year. The aim is to highlight whether there 
is any relationship between the level of subsidies to 
parastatals and budget deficit and whether the outcome has had 
any multiplier effects on public sector investment.
Budgetary Trends: 1983-84 to 1993-94
In Zimbabwe the Budget covers a period corresponding to one 
financial year. Historical data indicate that there existed a 
negative relationship between the expenditure and the revenue 
sides since 1980. An overview of the past 10 years underscore 
this reality. The deficit during the first two years of the 
period under review (1983-84 and 1984-85) registered a high
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budget deficit of 11%. In 1986 (the first year of the First Five 
year National Development Plan) the Budget deficit stood at 10%, 
one percentage point less, before rising to a staggering figure 
of 11,6% in 1986-87. A "see-saw" movement can be observed over 
the following years from a low of 9% in 1987-88 to 11% in 
1988-89 and again to 9% in 1989-90. The reduced budget deficit 
achieved in the 1989-90 financial year was seen by many as the 
incentive for the timing of unveiling ESAP in the last quarter 
of 1990.
Budgets From 1990 (First year of the ESAP) however had a well 
spelt-out objective or intention with respect to the level of 
the deficit for the 1990s: to reduce the deficit to 5% of GDP 
by 1994/95 financial year. Implicit in this thinking one would 
argue, is an understanding that the various spending and 
revenues components are not independent of each other, in 
either the short term or long term. Spending cuts that 
depress activity also depress output or income sensitive 
receipt. Supply-side friendly tax cuts or subsidies may recoup 
that part of the initial budgeting cost. While these problems 
are not specific to the approach under scrutiny, they are 
important when policy response to "inconsistency verdict" is 
being pondered (Butter 1990).
The question of how government intent to tackle the budget 
issue in 1990s does not cease to amaze. But before any 
explanation is attempted at, a brief account of the variables 
that comprise the expenditure and revenue sides is necessary.
The expenditure side of the budget comprise recurrent and 
capital investments and; net lending. Recurrent expenditure 
is the most important of the expenditure side in terms of its 
share of the resources. This includes all the obligations for 
maintaining day to day government operations. It accounted for 
about 84% of total expenditure (on average) over the 9 years 
to 1992. Capital expenditure, which is the capital budget for 
public investment, investment and net lending accounted for 
9%, 1% and 8% respectively. According to the 1990-91 budget 
the share of recurrent expenditure is put at 82%, but an 
increase to 84% in 1992-93 financial year is an indication 
that public sector investment continues to be constrained by 
the level of the recurrent expenditure even during the ESAP 
years.
Equally important is the revenue base to finance these 
expenditures. This side comprises of taxes/fees and 
aid/grants. Almost 97% of the total government revenue is 
generated from taxes/fees, aid/grants account for only 3% of 
total revenues. There is no space for tax increases as a 
source of more revenue as both corporate and personal tax 
rates are prohibitive. By widening the tax base ( to include 
the small businesses previously exempted) government's 
intention could be two fold: to maintain the balance between 
expenditures and revenues and to cushion itself against the 
effects of the supply side tax friendly cuts which began with 
the 1991-92 budget, in spite of the well calculated intention 
yields from this sector of the economy will be minimal in the
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medium term due mainly to the implementation problems likely 
to be encountered. It is on this basis that as far back as 
1981 government put it clear that it did not "wish recurrent 
expenditure to exceed revenue from taxes, as the basic policy 
for allowing sufficient resources for investment". This 
criterion has not been achieved and the budget deficit remains 
high.
Given this scenario one is tempted to argue that the solution 
to the size of the budget deficit could be found on the 
expenditure side, particularly the recurrent expenditure item. 
This is
precisely what government has come-up with in the 1990 
budgets: reduce the expenditure side with minimal tax 
concession. The irony of the matter is to implement this 
policy directive without negatively disturbing the 
relationship between the expenditure and revenue sides. The 
objective, as outlined in the statement (Gvt 1991) is to 
address the problems facing the economy, stimulate economic 
activity, and achieve a sustainable rate of growth of 5% per 
year in real terms. To achieve the above government has since 
1991 pursued an antirinflationary policy closely linked to 
government spending restraint.
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Budget deficit and PSEs' Subsidies
Why is the budget deficit central to the restructuring 
exercise? Firstly, the annual budget has developed not only 
into a central and independent instrument for resource 
mobilisation and distributions, but also into a major 
mechanism for restructuring of economic and financial policy. 
Secondly fiscal policy is largely to address to the problem of 
internal "imbalances", to bring aggregate demand in line with 
available resources and simultaneously stimulate domestic 
savings for both public and private investment.
Budget deficit consequently reflect the theoretical level of 
demand which can not be satisfied from own resources. The 
subsidies to PSEs as can be observed from Table 5 account for 
about 3.7% of the budget deficit. And the budgetary burden 
imposed by PSE may be met by measures that increase government 
revenue or reduce other expenditure or they may be passed 
forward into higher government deficits and hence be financed 
by borrowing or money creation. The latter seems to be more 
relevant to the Zimbabwean situation. In order to meet this 
demand government resort to borrowing from both foreign and 
local domestic markets. In this case the argument that not 
only are deficit reduction and public investments not mutually 
exclusive; the latter are more or less impossible without the 
former shows the complimentary relationship between the two.
Foreign borrowing, the argument goes, deprives the productive
sectors of the much needed foreign exchange precisely at the 
time that the productive sectors require foreign resources to 
re-equip. On a lighter note Table 3 shows that government has 
over the years been borrowing more on the domestic market 
(77%) and the remainder was sourced from foreign sources. A 
dramatic shift to external resources as the major source of 
budget deficit financing is observed with the introduction of 
ESAP. Local borrowing has plummeted from the high level of 94% 
in 1990-91 financial year to 60% and 57% in the following two 
financial years respectively. This could mean two things:
First it could mean there is an increased availability of 
foreign currency on the market due to reduced demand induced 
by a combination of monetary and exchange rate instruments 
being implemented to combat money supply and external 
imbalance. Second is that the shift could be due to external 
pressures on the fiscal authorities to curtail inflation 
(Sepehri and Loxley 1992).
Domestic borrowing leads to the "crowding out" of the 
productive sectors. As mentioned above government financed its 
deficit from borrowing on the domestic market. Table 4 
illustrates that much of the money was borrowed from non 
banking sector, limiting the inflationary gap to 26.7%. 
Inflation was contained at 15% and nominal interest rates 
averaged 12%, meaning that there was a negative real interest 
rate. Nonetheless limited consumer options and developed 
savings institutions helped to maintain a health savings rate 
of 20% per annum. These savings, coupled with negative real
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interest rates and low private investment demand allowed 
central government to finance its fiscal deficits of over 10% 
of GDP without directly crowding out private investment and 
without foreign debt exceeding 57% of GDP (see Gvt 1991) .
Government intention for the 1990s is, as has been discussed 
earlier, to reduce its deficit to 5% of GDP by 1994-95 
financial year. This can not be achieved through generation of 
more resources but by reducing the propensity to consume. PSEs 
subsidies, the size of the public service and the policy of 
free education have been identified as the fertile areas for 
streamlining demand. Fiscal reform is a priority area in the 
1990s where inflation and interest rates have recorded record 
figures of 46% and 49% respectively (in 1992). Productive 
investment has been negatively affected in the process. The 
urgency with which government would want to cut down on its 
expenditure can be assessed within this context. In such 
circumstances temptations to adopt crisis management policies 
and methods without understanding the processes by which 
expected improvements in performance are actually achieved 
become attractive.
PRIVATISATION AND PUBLIC SECTOR REFORMS
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Is privatisation the appropriate policy instrument for 
transformation of PSEs in developing countries? Which comes 
first privatisation or PSEs reforms? These are the lead 
questions that this section will grapple with. The intended
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objective is to highlight why privatisation is taking 
precedence over reforms on the donor community's economic 
programmes and illustrate whether it is indeed the right 
policy prescription for developing countries in their attempt 
to make PSEs profitable, efficient and simultaneously address 
the internal imbalance.
The unfolding of the Economic Structural Adjustment Programme 
has shifted speculation of the early 1990 into a cautioned 
debate on the impact of ESAP on both production and 
consumption. A combination of price de-control, devaluation 
of the dollar and the tight monetary policies have resulted in 
increased inflation, high interest rates and liquidity on the 
money market. As a result companies are closing down; shed 
off "excess" labour force and/or; work less days per week. 
Consumer resistance by the inflation hit urban inhabitants has 
made cost transfer by producers a mockery at the time of 
increasing manufacturing sector input cost and declining 
sales.
The budget deficit has remained around 9% of GDP two points 
off the target of 7% of GDP estimated for the 1991-92 
financial year and even went further up the following year to 
11% of GDP. These figures (9%;11%) are considered to be high 
by both World Financial Institutions (who are backing the 
adjustment programme) and Local economic analysts. A 
situation where government is moving swiftly in putting tight 
monetarist instruments in place whereas proceeding with
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caution in reducing its expenditure is evident. The magnitude 
of the drought relief exercise in 1991-1992 (necessitated by 
the severe drought which devastated the whole region) and the 
political sensitiveness of drastically cutting public 
expenditure might be contributing to the lop-sided approach 
by government.
A new phenomenon is emerging out of the above equation, though 
unceremoniously. The high visibility of the Public Sector" as 
the single biggest consumer of national resources is 
embarrassingly imposing itself. The argument that government 
is "crowding out" the Private Sector and that it is the major 
source of inflationary spiral is becoming substantive. 
Consequently the chance of upsetting the balance between the 
politics and economics of adjustment (all important to 
politicians) is growing by day as Public Sector becomes more 
vulnerable to pressure from the private sector to "bite the 
bullet" and release financial resources to the latter.
To represent the above sentiments a new but pregnant economic
concept, of privatisation has been on the local market since
the unveiling of ESAP (Masuko 1992). Privatisation is a
comparatively new word which made nor significant appearance
in political or economic literature before 1979. Pirie (1988)
defined privatisation as follows....
"Denationalization was taken (1951-55 Churchill) to mean 
the reversal of nationalisation, that is it meant handing 
back state industries to their previous owners. 
Privatisation by contrast, soon emerged as the process by 
which the production of goods sand services was 
transferred from the public to the private sector.
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At its lowest common denominator,it meant having done in 
the private sector that which previously had been done in 
the public sector."
Although Pirie went on to deal with this concept in a purely 
economistic fashion it is (from his very definition) a concept 
that embraces economic, social and political connotations and 
should be treated that way.
Privatisation is a legacy of the Thacherite era and the 
Chicago school of Economics. However, its popularisation in 
Zimbabwe could not have come at a better time when government 
expenditure and the Public Sector Borrowing Requirements 
(PSBR) are seen to be the main culprits responsible for the 
economic ills and particularly for the current high inflation. 
Above all, the argument runs, privatisation increases 
efficiency, reduces expenditure and is a precondition for 
economic growth (Pirie 198; Wessel 1991 and Moore 1992). The 
most appealing side of the argument is that proceeds from the 
programme could be used to off set other expenditure and 
finance the government tax reduction aspirations.
This model creates beyond any reasonable doubts massive 
incentives for "any government worth its salt" to put in place 
a privatisation programme. Marsh (1990) discussing 
privatisation under Thatcher admits that it is enough 
incentive to lull even the most sophisticated governments of 
the north. He observed that it is not surprising that the 
government seized upon privatisation as an alternative way to 
control the PSBR given that proceeds from such sales are
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treated as negative public expenditures and reduce PSBR. 
However a different story can be told when the variables of 
profitability, growth and efficiency are brought in the model. 
Wessel (1991) in an effort to qualify his earlier assertion on 
the effects of privatisation agree that profits and margins in 
privatised firms have grown and employment has declined, but 
the causality seems to run from growth and profitability to 
privatisation and not the other way round. This seems to put 
to rest the claim by advocates of markets that state 
contraction or at least compression into appropriate 
activities is a precondition for proper market functioning 
(Lipton 1991) .
Beyond political and ideological considerations the adoption 
of privatisation is developing countries can only be regarded 
as a temporary measure to respond to mounting pressure from 
the private sector organisations or to raise money without 
printing it in order to satisfy the supply side incentives.
But as the two objectives are in themselves more political 
than they are economic, efficiency and economic growth are 
likely to be sacrificed on the altar of ad-hocratic expediency 
(Masuko 1992).
According to the rule of the thump, privatising an enterprise 
does not imply breaking its monopoly. Neither is the sale of 
assets a necessary and sufficient condition for widespread 
managerial change or change in the managerial culture in the 
privatised companies. As a rule competition will remain
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severely limited and efficiency a pipe dream. Other 
underlying economic relationship are never taken to mind when 
privatisation is being marketed, argues Marsh (1990). Firstly 
there is the conflict between the need to ensure increased 
efficiency and the pressing desire to ensure a quick and 
successful sale. Secondly, because of the need to ensure 
management co-operation, efficiency which implied competition 
is likely to be compromised. Thirdly and more worrying is 
the fact that privatisation could be promoted even when such 
promotion would lead to increased public expenditure.
The claims of privatisation have been overstated and 
unsubstantiated. This is the conclusion drawn by Yoder et al 
(1991) in their study "Privatisation and Development: The 
Empirical Evidence". Nonetheless they caution that this is not 
to suggest that the solution is in the public sector either. 
Klitgaard (1991) concurred that the fact is neither the 
interventionist state or the minimalist state has guaranteed 
rapid development. Logically therefore hope lies in 
determining " the appropriate mix of public and private sector 
activity that, along with the proper regulatory and trade 
policy could lead to meeting national development objectives 
(Ibid). Some light at the end of the tunnel?
No! The ambiguity shrugged in this generalised statement tend 
to indicate that there is a centre stage somewhere between 
state and market or it could be what Wessel (1991) refers to 
as combining the market processes with public ownership. The
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reminder from Wessel though is that this linkage is 
artificial and prone to breakdown in the face of the natural 
affinity between market forces and private ownership. It is 
hard to say what Wessel really understood by these linkages 
although his reference to the concepts of Kornai of weak 
(referring to the former) and strong (to the latter) indicates 
that something was amiss: reform.-ing pnhlic sector enterprises 
as a policy instrument.
The "new school of thought" in this field of learning 
(Klitgaard 1991; Adam et al 1992; Marsh 1991; Grosh 1992; Cook 
1988;1993) recognised that the debate has been fraught with 
ideological and political pitfalls, almost invisible for their 
visibility. To illustrate this Cook (1993) questions why the 
World Bank after recognising as far back as 1983 that it is 
not ownership so much as market environment, firm organisation 
and incentives that determines performance still blindly 
pressurise governments in developing countries to privatise as 
a short term measure. Whereas the argument for privatisation 
(Pirie 1988 ; CZI surveys; WB World Reports; IMF papers; 
Hawkins 1993; Ndiweni 1993) sounds conclusive, authoritative 
and restrictive the "new school" shifts the debate beyond the 
contagious state versus market perspective and highlights the 
need for diagnosis of the problem and prescriptions of not 
only the right medicine but also to the right doses.
Privatisation therefore can or can not be the right method for 
eliminating the drag that PSEs are on the fiscus; make them
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efficient and profitable and simultaneously create the right 
environment for fair and efficient markets. This however 
depends on both the economic environment and the non economic 
factors at play in space and time. The privatisation crusade 
therefore represent one of those swings of pendulum of fashion 
in economic policy. To give the needed push to the pendulum 
from the "fire fighting" privatisation crusade Klitgaard 
(1991) poses two pertinent questions: How can the environment 
for fair and efficient markets be created? How can the PSE 
sector itself be made to function better? These are attempted 
at in the next section.
PSE REFORMS: A CASE FOR COMMERCIALISATION
Two important lessons can be drawn from the preceding section. 
First is that as much as privatisation holds the promise of 
contributing to the state treasury " immediately through 
public assets sale proceeds and eventually through higher tax
revenues from more profitable enterprises....widening
individual participation in corporate ownership (Adam et al 
1992) and enhance productive and allocative efficiency (Wessel 
1991), the causative relationship between growth and 
profitability on one hand and privatisation on the other hand 
runs from the former to the latter and not vice versa. Second, 
it has ben observed that it is not so much of ownership than 
market environment, firm organisation and managerial 
incentives which determine the performance of companies. These 
two "set-pieces" are not mutually exclusive, they are
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complimentary. They provide the parameter for the discussion 
in this section. The argument is that commercialisation is the 
most fitting policy instrument for reforming PSEs in Zimbabwe 
in the short to medium term.
The rationale on which the argument for commercialisation is 
being advanced is simple and straight forward. Consensus has 
it that Public Enterprises in Zimbabwe make heavy drafts on 
the national budget and are a drag on the economy. As a rule 
, the Zimbabwe government's aim is to eliminate the large 
budgetary burden of PSEs and make them more efficient (Gvt 
1991). If the remedy depends on the diagnosis then to meet 
these two objectives a change in the modus operandi of the 
PSEs should be effected to conform with the commonly accepted 
commercial principles. The underlying causes of their poor, 
performance, although not always important to critics, justify 
the approach. These are summarised below...
i. Government pricing policies have not allowed a 
number of important PSEs to cover their costs.
ii. "Soft budget" constraints enshrined in their Acts
iii. Lack of autonomy and accountability of the PSEs 
Board of Directors and Managers.
iv. Impact of external factors
The above causes are not only particular to Zimbabwe as other 
studies have shown (Grosh 1992; Selowsky and Karian 1991; 
Anglade 1993; ECA 1991). These put into perspective the need 
to create a conducive economic, socio-political and
institutional environment from below as the initial stage of 
transforming PSEs from loss making to efficient enterprises in 
developing countries rather than from the top as is the case 
through privatisation. Floyd et al (1983) pointed out clearly 
that profitable, efficient as well as PSEs operating in 
conformity with commonly accepted commercial principles would 
not constitute a drain on the financial resources or lead to 
monetary expansion.... Latest findings also confirm this 
position beyond any reasonable doubt as Adam et al (1992) 
show. They demonstrate that PSEs reforms have "directly 
contributed much more to rationalisation than privatisation 
and.... to overall improvement of fiscal balance. Grosh (1992) 
in her study of PSEs in Kenya was more precise when she 
observed that ".. their success at containing unit cost and 
refraining from monopolistic pricing demonstrates that it is 
possible to appoint capable and public spirited managers who 
will do a good job without punitive or restrictive controls." '
In Zimbabwe commercialisation should therefore be directed at 
addressing the causes of poor performance in these companies 
and eliminate losses. Table 6 demonstrates that by eliminating 
losses of and therefore subsidies to PSEs the other objective 
of treasury (balancing total revenues with recurrent 
expenditure) ceteris paribus, and to the extent of creating a 
saving, will be within reach. However resistance to 
commercialisation, as is expected to any change, from interest 
groups which would stand to benefit more in the case of 
privatisation has been open and blunt. It is viewed (in these
circles) merely as a bureaucratic move which will only add 
another layer on their unit cost of production, eventually 
leading to pricing them out of business.
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None-the-less what is emerging out of this dimension is that 
whereas losses are incurred at the PSE level, private firms 
are subsidised in the process. Although the Cotton Marketing 
Board (CMB) and the National Railways of Zimbabwe (NRZ) etc 
are criticized (by the private sector) for making perennial 
losses, consumers of cotton lint and related products or of 
rail services benefit handsomely. In spite of existence of 
this invisible relationship there is no social accounting 
matrix to clearly represent these transactions. The benefits 
are therefore not reflected both on the market and on the 
balance sheets of the beneficiaries. A more recent example 
pertains to the commercialisation of the CMB which among other 
changes increased the price of cotton lint to border price 
level (export parity price) (the price was 45% less before the 
increase). This change prompted the whole textile and clothing 
industry to lobby with government for a redress resulting in 
government intervening to cut the price temporarily by about 
21%. This indicates that as soon as PSEs start to operate 
profitably those who used to collect excess rents would feel 
the pinch on their balance sheets.
Critics though should borrow a leaf from Adam et al's (1992) 
and Cook and Monigue's (1988) important contributions to 
policy in this area of reforms. Two important variables of 
economic environment (see Adam for discussion) and non­
economic factors (see Cook) have to be taken into account when 
policy changes in developing countries are advocated for. Two 
recent evaluative studies on the progress of the 
implementation of privatisation confirm the relevance of these 
variables. The seminal volumes (Adam 1992; Grosh 1992) both 
reviewed by Cook (1993) point to the fact that prospects for 
privatisation remain limited. Adam rightly points out that " 
where competition policy, market structure and regulatory 
environment are underdeveloped the transfer of assets 
ownership can simply result in continuing operating 
inefficiencies with excess rents being collected by the 
private sector instead of the public sector". High foreign 
participation is observed in the privatised enterprises and a 
large proportion of the privatisations recorded were made 
outside of the formal markets, a finding which Cook concludes, 
brings into question whether capital markets represent 
formidable constraints to asset sales or whether as vehicles, 
they are crucial for stimulation of private sector 
development.
However Adam et al's main worry is in achieving the goal of 
improved efficiency, indeed the central economic argument for 
privatisation - which he admits is most often subordinated 
when trade-offs occur. He writes...
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"Not only will the programme come against the binding 
constraints of the economy, but also the political 
intervention required to secure the success of 
privatisation in periods of crisis may actually 'lock in' 
welfare reducing elements. Underwriting and underpricing 
arrangements, guarantees on market access, and over 
generous restructuring, which are required to see sales 
proceed in such circumstances are precisely such 
impediments to efficiency-enhancing privatisation."
In Zimbabwe the deregulation of the economy in general and the 
attempts at commercialisation in particular have led to new 
actors penetrating into areas were PSE monopolies existed. 
Specific reference can be made in the case of those sectors 
which were exclusively the domain of Marketing Boards (
Cotton; Beef; Grain and Milk). PSEs have to compete or sink.
If it is upheld that competition is the best measurement of 
efficiency - whether productive or allocative - then the 
preliminary observation that in these sectors competition is 
starting to direct the market is a health indication that 
improved efficiency is being enhanced and from below.
These however are preliminary observations which need to be 
taken with caution. More indepth and broader studies have to 
be carried out to assess the impact of these changes on the 
performance indicators of PSEs; on the character and nature of 
the new actors in the market. The effect of PSE reforms on the 
other sectors of the economy (particularly those sectors that 
benefited from subsidies) should also be assessed. What 
changes can be observed in what Adam and Cook identified as 
economic environment and non-economic factors respectively as 
PSE reforms proceed?,etc.
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CONCLUSION
It is true that many public enterprises make heavy drafts on 
the national budget and are a drag on the Zimbabwean economy. 
Correctly pointing this out by no means creates an assumption 
of the opposite kind, that the state can never be relatively 
more competent to perform entrepreneurial functions than the 
private sector. It may be or may not, depending on time, 
place and circumstances of a particular sector and industry 
within the economy.
The appropriate policy approach in the short and medium term 
is to commercialise the PSEs as it addresses all the factors 
constraining their performance. This would cut the losses of 
these enterprises and reduce the budget deficit, ceteris 
paribus, to around 5% of GDP; balancing off the revenue and 
recurrent expenditure in the process. It has been observed 
also that new actors enter into different sectors previously 
administratively protected for PSEs, as reforms proceed. The 
new development is contributing to the development of a 
competitive environment, a precondition for productive and 
allocative efficiency. As a rule the economic environment and 
non-economic factors which constitute the necessary and 
sufficient conditions for privatisation, become, within the 
parameters of this approach to efficiency and growth, 
products of commercialisation rather than constraints on its 
implementation as is the case with privatisation.
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